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ABA MODEL RULES

Rule 4.1

'TI~AI~S~.C`I'IOl~tS '4VI'I'~I I'E12SOl~TS
OTHER 'I'HAI~I CL,IEN'I'S
IZUL~ 9~e~: TRUT]HFULNESS IN
STATEMENTS TO OTHERS
In the course of representing a client a lawyex shall not
knowingly:
(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third
person; ox
(b)fail to disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary
to avoid assisting a crinninal or fraudulent act by a client, unless
disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.

Corm~ent
Misrepresentation

',

(lj A lawyer is required to be truthful when dealing with others on
a client's behalf, but gener111y his no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant facts. A znisrepresent~tion can occur if the lawyer incorporates or affirms 1 statement of another person that the lawyer
knows is False. MisxepresentltiozZs can also occur by partially true but
misleading statements or amissions that are the eq~.iiv~lent of affirmative
false statements. Por dishonest conduct that does not amotmt to a false
statement or for misrepresentations by a lawyex other than in the course
of representing ~ client, see Rule 8.~.

3,;

l
Y

StRtements of Fact
[2J This Rule refers to statemexzts of fact. Whether a particular statemeat should be regarded as one of £act can depend on the circumstances.
Under generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of
statements ordinarily are not taken ~s statements of material fact. Estimates of price or value placed on the subject of a transaction and 1 party's
intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are ordinarily in this
category, and so is the existence of an undisclosed principal except where
nondisclosure of the principal would constitute fraixd. Lawyers should
be mindful of their obligations under appliclble law to avoid criminal
and tortious misrepresentation.
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TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS OTHER THAN CLIENTS

Rixle 4.2

Crirt~te or .~'raucl by Client
[3] Uncler Rule 1.2(d), a lawyer is prohibited fi~otn counseling ar assisting aclient in conduct that the Lawyer knows is criminal oz• fratidulent. I'aragr~ph (h) states a specific application of the principle set forth
iz1 Rule 1.2(d) and addresses the situation where a client's crime oz- frlud
t7kes the form of a lie or misrepresentation. Ordinarily, a lawyer can
avoid assisting a client's crime or fraud by withdrawing from the representation. Sometimes ifi z~nay be necessary for the 1lwyer to give notice of
the fact of withdrawal end to disaffirm an opinion, document, affirmation or the like. In extreme cases, substantive law may require a lawyer to
disclose information relating to the representation to avoid being deemed
to have assisted the client's crime or fi~~ud. If the Dwyer can avoid assisting aclient's crime or fraud only by disclosing this information, then
under paragraph (b) the lawyer is required to do so, unless the disclosure
is prohibited by Rule 1.6.

Definitional Cross-References
"Pra~.ldulent" See Rule 1.0(d)
"Knowingly" See Rule 1.0(f)

17.7

https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss9/34
DOI: 10.58188/1941-8043.1347

W..~. ~..w, .,_

2

Gaal: Handout 3: Transactions with Persons Other Than Clients

TRANSACTZCINS WITH PERSONS

OTHER THAN CLIENTS

Rule 4.2

N WITH PERSON
RULE 4.2: COMMUNICATIO
L
REPRESENTED BY COUNSE
shall not communicate
In representing a client, a lawyer
on with a person the lawyer
about the subject of the representati
r lawyex in the matter, unless
knows to be represented by anothe
other lawyer or is authorized
the lawyer has the consent of the
to do so by law ox a court order.

Camrnent

l sysproper functioning of the lega
[1J This Rule contributes to the
yer
law
~
by
has chosen to be represented
tem by protecting a person who
p~rare
~reaching by other lawyers who
in a matter abainst posszble ovez
client-lawence by those lawyers with the
ticipating in the matter, interfer
relating
ion
rmat
led disclosure of info
yer relationship and tl~e uncounsel
to the representation.
reptions with any perso~z who is
j2] This Rule applies to communica
icatzon
matter to which the comm~.uz
g
resented by counsel concernin the

i

relates.
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~;

d person initiates or
[3] The Rule applies even though the represente
immediately tezminate
consents to the communication. A lawyer must
communication, the
ng
enci
comm
communication with a person if, after
nication is not
commu
lawyer learns that the person is one with whom
permitted by this Rule.
ion with a represented
[4] This Rule does not prohibit communicat
n, concerning matters
person, ox an employee or agent of such a perso
ence of a controversy
outside the representation. For example, the exist
party, ox between two org~between a government agency and a private
from communicating with
nizations, sloes not prohibit a lawyer for either
ding a separate matter. Nor
nonlawyer representatives o£ the other regar
a represented person who is
does this Rule preclude communication with
wise representing a client
seeking advice from a lawyer who is not other
nication prohibited by
in the matter. A lawyer may not make a commu
8.4(a). Parties to a matter
this Rule through the acts of another. See Rule
a lawyer is not prohibrelay communicate directly with each other, and
nication that the client is
ited from. advising a client concerning a commu
independent justification
legally entitled to make. l~Iso, a lawyer having
a represented person is
or legal authorization fox communicating with
permitted to do so.
include communica[57 Communications authorized by law may
exercising a constitutional
tions by a lawyer on behalf of a client who is
nment. Communicaoz other legal right to communicate with the gover
e activities of lawigativ
invest
tions authorized by law may also include
oz through investigative
yers representing governmental entities, directly
or civil enforcement proagents, prior to the commencement of crSmin~l
sed in a criminal matter, a
ceedings. When communicating with the acc~:i
in addition to honoring
Rule
governrxtent lawyez must comply with this
fact that a comm~.lnication
the constitutional rights of the accused. The
onal right is insufficient to esdoes not violate a state oz federal constituti
this Rule.
tablish that the communication is permissible under
ion with a repnicat
[6) A lawyer who is uncertain whether a commu
r may also
A
lawye
order.
resented person is permissible may seek a court
to autharize a commuseek a court order in exceptional circumstances
by this Rule, fox example,
nication that would otherwise be prohibited
d by counsel is necessary
where communication with a person represente
to avoid reasonably certain injury.
prohibits com[7] In the case of a represented organization, this Rule
vises, disuper
who
on
izati
munications with a constituent of the organ
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S OT~iE.it Ti-~Alot CLIENTS

TRANSAC'b'IO1V5 WITH PERSON

Ibule 4.3

yer concerning
with the organization's law
ts
sul
con
rly
ut~
reg
or
s
rect
with respect to
to obligate the organization
the matter or has authority
matter. tnay
ssion in connection with th.e
the mater ox whose act or omi
criminal Iiability.
ion for purposes of civil oz
be iznputect to the organizat
munication
Iawyer is not required for com
Consent ~f the organization's
is repreion
zat
Zf ~ constituent of the organi
with a foxiner constituent.
t countha
by
her own counsel, the consent
sented izz the matter by his oz
this Rule. Combe sufficient for purposes of
will
on
ati
zic
mLu
com
a
to
sel
mer constituent
tin~ wifh a current or for
pare Rule 3.4(f). In communic~
aining evidence
must riot use methods of obt
of an organization, 1 lawyer
the organization. See Ruie 4.4.
that violate the legal rights of
ed person
ications with a represent
[8) The prohibition on commun
that the person is
s where the lawyer knows
only applies in circumstance
ns that the lawter to be discussed. This mea
in fact repxesented in tl~e mat
but such acthe fact of the repz-esentation;
yer has act2~al knowledge of
See Rule 1.0{f).
ed from the czrcuznstances.
err
inf
be
y
zna
dge
wle
kno
l
t~,ia
the consent
the requirement of obtaining
Thus, the lawyer cannot evade
obvious.
of counsel by closing eyes to the
municates is
with whom ehe lawyer com
[9J In the event the person
lawyer's corzlby counsel in the matter, the
ed
ent
res
rep
be
to
wn
kno
not
e 4.3.
municati.ons ire subject to Rul
raees
~9e£ir~itnonal Cross-Refere
"Knows" See Rule 1.0(f)
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T12AlVSACTIONS WITS-I I'EItSO1~tS OTC€~R TI3AN CLIENTS

dZule 4.3

It~~,~ 4<3o I~EALIIlTG'WITH
I.JIOtR~E~'RESEI~ITED I~ERSON
In dealing an behalf o£ a client with ~ person who is not
represented by coixnsei, a lawyer shall xlot state or imply that
the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably
shoixld i<now that the unrepresented pexson nnisundersta~acis the
lawyer's role in the matter, Ehe lawyex shall make reasonable
efforts to correct the mzsixnderstancling. The lawyer shad not give
legal advice to an unrepresented person, other tk~an the advnce
to sec~r~re counsel,if the lawyer knows r~r reasonably si~ou~d
know that the in#exests of such a person ire or have a reasa~abfle
possibility of being ira c~n£~ict with the ii~te~~ests ~E tae cl~~nt.
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https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss9/34
DOI: 10.58188/1941-8043.1347

6

Gaal: Handout 3: Transactions with Persons Other Than Clients
1Zule 4.3

~~~ i~[ODEL RU~.ES

~~~~~~

[1] An unt-epresented person, particulaxly one not experienced in
dealixlg with legal matters, might ~ssuzne that a lawyer is disinterested in
loyalties or is a disinterested authority on the law even when the lawyer
represents ~ client. In order to avoid a misunderstanding, a lawyer will
typically need to 'identify the lawyex's client and, where necessary, explain that the client has interests opposed to those of the unrepresented
person. For misitnderstandi.ngs that sometimes arise when a lawyer for
an organization deals with ~n unrepresented constituent, see Rule 1.13(f).
[2~ The Rule distinbuishes between situations involving unrepresented persons whose interests may be adverse to those of the lawyer's
client and those in which the person's interests are not in conflict with
the client's. In the formex situation, the possibility that the lawyer will
compromise the unrep~•esented person's interests is so great that the RLile
prokiibits the giving of any advice, apart from tkte advice to obtain counsel. Whether a lawyer is givzng impermissible advice znay depend on the
experience end sophistication of the cinrepresertted person, as well as the
setting iz~ which the behavior and comments occur. This Rule does not
prohibit a lawyer from negotiating the terms of a transaction or settling
a dispute with an tiinrepresented person. So long ~s the lawyer has explained that the lawyer represents az1 adverse party and is not representll1b the person, the Iawyer may inform the person of the terms on which
the lawyer's client will enter into an agreement or settle a matter, prepare
documents that require the person's sibature and explain the lawyer's
own view of the meaning of the document ox the lawyer's view of the
tu~derlying lega] obligltions.
~7efi~ai~a~~a~~ Cross~Referenees
"Knows" See Rt11e 2.0(f)
"Reasonable" See Rule 1.0(h)
"Reasonably shou]d lczzow" See Rule 1.0(j)

120
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~~r~,~ ~o~o ~~~~~~~~ ~~~
that
~a~ ~~n x~~~es~~t~aab a sl~en~, ~ l~~vye~ ~'~~1~ a~o~t ~1~e a~aean~
~telay, ~r
~~v~ a~~a s~.a'v~t~r~~aad paaY~~se ~t~Q~ ~~C~~ ~o es~a~arrass,
ce
e~r~den
x~g
ob~a~ni
~f
~~
rese~~~s
~S~ax~l~xs ~ t~ir~ ~Se~~or~, ~~ 3ase
,
~~ea~ ~r~~o~~~p t~~ ~e;z~~ x;gi~ks flf s~as~a r~ pers~r~
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TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS OT~IER THAN CLIENTS

Rule 4.4

(b)A lawyer who receives a document or electronically stored
information xelating to the representation of the tawyer'~ client
and knows or reasonably should know that the document or
electronically stored information was inadvertently sent shall
promptly notify the sender.

i

~~r~,~;
,. fir

j

~~~

~
`
j
~

~'
<~ 14'
rt ~.
~"'~ `
`' ''rye
~z
~' ;~
'~*~
~ .~

~

~omrrtent

~

[1] Responsibility to a client requires a lawyer to subordinate the
interests of others to those of the client, but that responsibility does not
imply that a Lawyer may disregard khe rights of third persons. It is impractical to catllogue all such rights, b~.it they include legal reslricEions on
methods of obtaining evidence from third persons and unwarranted intrusions into privileged relationshi~~s, such as the client-lawyer relationship.
[2) Paragraph (b) recognizes that lawyers sometimes receive a document or. electronically stored information that was mistakenly sent
or produced by opposing pa~~ties or their lawyers. A document or electz•onically stored information is inadvertently sent when it is accidentally krazzsmitted, such as whezl an email or letter is mis~ddressed or a
document or electronically stored information is accidentally included
~,~ith information thlt was intentionally transmitted.. If a lawyer lalows
oz reasonably should know that such a document or electronically stared
informatiozz was sent inadvez~te~~tly, then this Rule requires the Lawyer to
promptly notify the sender in order to permit that person to tike protecfive measures. W1.lether the lawger is required to take ad.ditiona.l steps,
such as rehzrning the document or deleting electronically stored inforinltion, is a matter of law beyond the scope of. these Rules, as is the question
of whether the privileged status of a document oz~ electronically stored
in£o.rmation has been waived. Similarly, this Rule does not address the
legal duties o£ a lawyer who receives 1 docLiment or electronically stored
informltion that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know may have
been inappropriately obtained by the sending person. For purposes of
this 12u1e, "document or electrox~.i.cally stored izzformation" includes, in
~dditiozz to paper doct~tnents, email and other forms of electronically
stored inform~ition, including embedded data (commonly referred to as
"metadata"), that is subject to being react or put into readable form. 1VIetadata in electronic documents creates an obligation under this Rule only if
the receiving lawyer knows or reasonzbly shoLrid know that the metadata
was inadvertently sent to the receiving lawyer.

~`
~`
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~'
C
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T~v1e x.54

A~P~. Ntfl~E~, RU~,E~

[3J Some lawyers .may choose to return a document or delete electrorucallystored information tuu~eact, for example, when the lawyer
Learns
before receiving it that it was i_riadvertently sent. Where a Lawyer is not
required by applicable iaw to do so, the decision to voluntarily z-eturn such
a
document or delete electronically stored information is a matter
of professional judgment ordinarily reserved to the lawyer. See Rules 7..2 and 1.4.
~~fi~aat~~a~~i~ ~r~ss~~~fer~z~~e~
"Knows" See Rule "1.0(i)
"Reasonably should know" See Rule 1.0(j)
"Substantial" See Rule 1.0(1)
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MAiNTAININ+G THE Il~d~'EGAZiTX ~F "I'HE ~'IdOFESS301~i

Rule 8.3

IZ~JL~ ~.3o ILEPoflZ'~'yN~
Pr~o~Essro~ra~,l~isco~~uc~r
(a) A lawyez vvho knows that another lawyer has coznxnitteel
a
a violation of the Rr~les of Professnonal Conduct thafi raises
ess
orthin
trustw
y,
honest
's
lawyer
ghat
substantial. question as to
the
inform
shaJ.l
s,
or fitness as a lawyer in other respect
appropriate pxofesszonal authority.
(b)Ps lawyer who knows that a jbidge has co~mmitked a
a
violation of applicable rules of~ judicial condrzct that raises
shall
substantial question as to the judge's iif~ess fore office
ty.
authori
inform the appropriate
(c) This Rule does not require disclosure of information
by a
otherwise protected by l[~ule 1.6 or inforix~atioz~ gained
s
lawyer
ved
appro
lawyer or j~ndge while participating in are
assistance program.
Co~xa~aae~t

that members of
[1] Self-regulation. of the legal profession requires
they know of a
when
the profession initiate disciplinary investigation
rs have a similar
violation o£ the Rules of Professional Conc-luct. Lawye
apparently isolated
obligattion with respect to judicial misconduct. An

167.
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Rixle 8.3
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ABA MODEL RULES

violation may indicate a pattern of misconduct that
only 1 disciplinary
investigation can uncover. Reporting a ~~iolation
especi
is
ally important
where the victim is unlikely to discover the offense.
[2] A report about misconduct is not required where
it would involve
violation of Rule 7..6. However, a lawyer shocild encou
rage a dzent to consent to disclosure where prosecution would not
substantially prejudice
the client's interests.
[3] If a lawyer wexe obliged to report every violation
of the R~rles, the
Ea~ilure to report any violation would itself be a profes
sional offense. Such a
re uimment existed in roan urisdictions but roved
to be tuzenforceable.
This RuJ.e limits the reporting obligation to thse
offenses that ~ self-regulating profession must vigorously endeavor to prevent.
A measure of judgrnent is, therefore, required in complying with the provis
ions of this Rule.
The term "substantial" refers to the seriousness of the
possible offense
and not the quantum of evidence of which the lawyer
is aware. A report
should be .made to the bar disciplinary agency ~ulless
some other agency,
such as a peer review agency, is more appropriate
in the circumstances.
Similar. considerations apply to the reporting of
judicial misconduct.
[4J The d~.ity to report professional miscondlrct does
not apply to a
lawyer retained to represent a lawyer whose profes
sional conduct is in
question. Such a situation is governed by the Rules
applicable to the client-lawyer relatiozlship,
[5] Information about a lawyer's or judge's misconduct
or fitness
may be received by a lawyer in the course of that lawye
r's participation in
an approved lawyers or judges assistance program. In that
circumstance,
providing for an exception to the reporting requiremen
ts of paragraphs
(a} and (b) of this Rule encourages i~wyers and
judges to seek treatment
through such a program. Conversely, without such an
exception, lawyers
and judges may hesztate to seek assistance froze these
programs, which
may then result in additional harm to their professiozla
l careers and additiozlal injury to the welfare o£ clients and the public
. These Rules do not
otherwise address the confidentiality o£ information
received by a lawyer
or judge participating in an approved lawyers assist
ance program; such
an obligation, however, may be imposed by the
rules of the program or
other law.

'`;

~

i

{
'
~

I~efiniiional Cross-References
"Knows See Rule 1.0(f)
"Substantial" See Rule 1.0(I)

r~ ~~~
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MAINT'ATNING THE INTEGRITX OF THE PROFESSION

Rule 8.4

MULE 8.4: 1VIISCONDUCT

E

~'
~.

It is professional misconduct for a lawyex to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional
Condixct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do
so through the acts of another;
(b)cornxniE a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation;
(d)engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration
of 'ustice;
(e)state or imply an ability to in#luence innproperly a
government agency oz official or to achieve results by means
that violate the Rules of Pxofessional Conduct or other law; or
(f) knowingly assist a judge ox judicial officer in conduct that
is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct ox other law.

~
~'
~ `-

Comment
[1) Lawyers Ire subject to discipline whezl they violate or attempt to
anviolate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce
other to do so or do so through the acts of another, as when they request
oz instruct an agent to do so on the lawyer's behalf. Paragz~aph (a), howaction
ever, does not prohibit a lawyer from advising a client concerning
the client is legally entitled to take.
[2) Ntany kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to pracfailtice law, s~.ich as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful
carry
offenses
of
kinds
ure to file ~n income tax return. However, some
of
no such implication. Tr~d.itionally, the distinction was drawn in terms
to
d
offenses involving "moral turpitude." That concept can be construe
such ~s
include offenses concerning some matters of personal morality,
to fiton
connecti
specific
adultery and comparable offenses, that have no
le
answerab
y
ness fo.r the practice of law. Although a lawyer is personall
answerable
to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally
relevant to law
only for offenses that indicate lack o£ those characteristics
trust, or seriof
breach
pxactice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty,
category. A
that
ous interference with the administration of justice are in
when conpattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance
sidered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation.
knowingly
[3] A lawyer who, in the course of representing a client,

163

Published by The Keep, 2014

13

Journal of Collective Rule
Bargaining
in the Academy,ABA
Vol. MODEL
0, Iss. 9 [2014],
RULESArt. 34
8.4

i

a

~`
E
;_

manifests by words oz conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age,sexual orientation or socioeconomic
status, violltes paragraph (d) when such actions ire prejudicial to the administration of justice. Legitimate advocacy respecting the Foregoing factors does not violate plragraph (d). A trial judge's finding that peremptory challenges were exercised on a discriminatory basis does not done
establish a violation o.f this rule.
[4j A la~~yer may refuse to comply with an obligation imposed by
law upon a good faith belief that no v11id obligation exists. The provisions of Rule 1.2(d) concerning a good faith challenge to the validity,
scope, meaning or application of the law apply to challenges of 1eg11 regul~tion of. the practice of law.
[5] Lawyers holding pixblic office assume legal respozlsibilities going
beyond those of other citizens. A lawyer's abuse of public office can suggent an inability to fulfill t11e professional role of lawyers. The same is
true of abuse of positions o£ private txust such as trustee, executor, administrator, gti~~rdi~n, agent and officer, director or managez- of a corpoxation or other organization.

3
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~
t

s
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Definitional Cross-Re#erences
"Fraud" See Rule 1.0(d)
"Knowingly" See Rule 1.0(f)
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AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
STANDING COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Formal Opinion 11-461
Advising Clients Regarding Direct Contacts with Represented Persons

August 4, 2011

Parties to a legal matter have the right to communicate directly with each o[her. A lawyer may advise a
client ofthat right and may assist the client regarding the substance ofany proposed communication. The
lawyer's assistance need not be promplecl by a rega~estfrom the client. Such assistance may not, however,
result in overreaching by the lawyer. ~
A lawyer may not communicate with a person the lawyer knows is represented by counsel, unless
counsel has consented to the communication or the communication is authorized by law or
person's
that
court order. AF3A Model Rule 4.2(sometimes called the "no contact" rule). Further, a lawyer may not use
an intermediary, i.e., an agent or another, to communicate directly with a represented person in violation of
the "no contact" rule.2
It sometimes is desirable for parties to a litigation or transactional matter to communicate directly
with each other even though they are represented by counsel. Two examples may be where the parties wish
to cement a settlement or break an impasse in settlement negotiations. 7n this opinion, the Committee
explores the limits within which it is ethically proper under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct for a
lawyer to assist a client regarding communications the client has a right to have with a person the lawyer
knows is represented by counsel. Even though parties to a matter are represented by counsel, they have the
right to communicate directly with each other.' In addition, a client may require the lawyer's assistance
and a lawyer may be reasonably expected to advise or assist the client regarding communications the client
desires to have with a represented person. A client may ask the lawyer for advice on whether the client
may lawfully communicate directly with a represented person without their lawyer's consent or their
lawyer being present. The comments to Rules 4.2 and 8.4{a) state that such advice is proper,4 Even if the
client has not asked for the advice, the lawyer may take the initiative and advise the client that it may be
desirable at a particular time for the client to communicate directly with the other party.
For example, a lawyer represents a client in a marital dissolution. The client's husband also is
represented by counsel. The parties and their lawyers have reached an impasse in their negotiations over
various issues. The client may ask her lawyer if she may corramunicate directly with her husband to see if
an agreement can be reached on some contested issues. Alternatively, the lawyer mibht independently
~ 'This opinion is based on the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct as amended by the ABA House of Delegates
through August 2011. The laws, court rules, regulations, rules of professional conduct, and opinions promulgated in
individualjurisdictions are controlling.
Z Rule 8.4(a). The Rule states: "[iJt is professional misconduct for a lawyer to violate or attempt to violate the Rules of
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another." ABA Comm.
on F.,thics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-395 (1995)('`Since a lawyer is barred under Rule 4.2 from
communicating with a represented party about the subject of the representation, she [under Rule 8.4(a)] may not
circumvent the Rule by sending an investigator to do on her behalf that which she is herself forbidden to do.");
however,
ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 408 (ABA 7'" Ed. 2011} ("A IBwyeC may not,
person.").
represented
with
a
communication
"mastermind" a client's
3 See Holdren v. General Motors Corp., 13 F.Supp.2d 1192, 1195(D. Kan. 1998)("there is nothing in the disciplinary
rules which restrict a client's right to act independently in initiating communications with the other side, or which
requires that lawyers prevent or attempt to discourage such conduct." (citing New York City Bar Association Formal
Opinion No.1991-2, at 5-6)); Dorsey v. EIome Depot U.S.n., Inc., 271 F.Supp.2d 726, 730 {D.Md.2003)("Nothing in
the law prohibits litigants or potential litigants from speaking among and between themselves, as opposed to attorneys
for such parties attempting direct communications with represented parties."); Northwest Bypass v. U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, 488 F.Supp.2d 22, 28-29 (D.N.H. 2007)(not improper for represented party to communicate directly with
represented opponent).
See Rule 4.2 cmt. 4 ("A lawyer may not make a communication prohibited by this Rule through the acts of another.
See also Rule 8.4(a) cmt. i ("[,awyers are subject to discipline when they violate or attempt to violate the Rules of
Nrofessional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so through the acts of another, as when they
request or instruct an agent to do so on the lawyer's behalf. Paragraph (a), however, does not prohibit a lawyer from
advising a client concerning action the client is legally entitled to take.").
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suggest that the possibility of resolving outstanding issues would be enhanced if the client communicates
directly with her husband. The client also might benefit from the lawyer's advice on how she should
conduct such settlement negotiations, the topics or issues to be covered, and the goals or objectives to be
reached. The client also could ask the lawyer to prepare a marital settlement agreement with the goal of
having her husband execute the agreement during her meeting with him.
The language of Rule 4.2 Comment [4] raises the primary question addressed in this opinion, to
what extent may the lawyer advise and assist the client in communicating directly with the represented
husband without violating Rule 4.2 through the acts of another, i.e., the clients However, there is tension
between Comment [1] to Rule 4.2 and Rule 8.4(a). In ABA Formal Op. 92-362 (1992), this Committee
opined that, without violating Rules 4.2 and 8.4 (a), a lawyer may ethically advise the client to
communicate directly with a represented adversary to determine if the adverse party's lawyer had informed
them that a settlement offer was pending. The inquiring lawyer in the opinion represented the plaintiff in a
civil case in which the defendant also was represented by counsel. Previously, the plaintifFs lawyer made a
settlement offer to opposing counsel, Plaintiffs lawyer had received no response, and the case was set for
trial in two weeks. Plaintiffs lawyer suspected that opposing counsel had not informed the defendant of the
offer. [n that opinion, the Committee concluded that, although the plaintiff's lawyer could not
communicate the settlement offer directly to the defendant without violating Rule 4.2, the plaintiff's lawyer
had an ethical duty under Rules 1.1, 1.2(a), and 1.4{b) to advise the client that the lawyer believed his
settlement offer had not been communicated by defendant's counsel to the defendant and that the plaintiff
had the right to speak directly with the defendant to determine whether the settlement offer had been
communicated.
ABA Formal Op. 92-362 acknowledged tension between the lawyer's decision to advise the client
of the right to communicate directly with a represented adversary and Rule 8.4(a)'s prohibition against the
lawyer's doing indirectly what the lawyer cannot do directly. Nevertheless, the Committee concluded that
"where the purpose of the communication is to ascertain whether a settlement offer has been communicated
to the other party, Rule 8.4(a) should not be read to preclude the lawyer's fulfilling the lawyer's duty,
reasonably expected by the client, fully and fairly to advise the client of the lawyer's best professional
judgment as to the exercise of the client's rights in furtherance of the representation,"' The Committee
expressly indicated that it was not addressing what the lawyer might tell the client to say to the other party
and where the line might be crossed before running afoul of Rule 8.4(a). The Committee was careful to
note that if the client was only going to find out if the other party had been told of the offer, there would be
no violation of the rules. Several bar ethics committees likewise have concluded that it is not a violation of
the professional conduct rules for a lawyer to suggest or recommend that the client communicate directly
with a represented person,$
The decision to communicate directly with a represented person may be the client's idea or the
lawyer's. Some decisions and opinions suggest that counsel may be violating the rules prohibiting
communication with a represented party by encouraging or failing to discourage a client speaking directly
(Kan.1977)
S We conclude that a lawyer's client is "another" for purposes of Rule 8.4(a). In re Marietta, 569 P.2d 921
(lawyer sanctioned for preparing release and advising client to pass it on to represented adverse party); S.F. Bar
Informal Opinion 1985-1 (1985)("it would be inappropriate ... for (a] lawyer to use the client as an indirect means of
communicating with the adverse party" in settlement negotiations).
Regarding
B ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-362(1992)(Contact With Opposing Party
88.
85,
(ABA
2000)
at
1983-1998
OPINIONS
INFORMAL,
ETHICS
FORMAL
AND
Offer),
in
Settlement
/d. at 89.
urge
8 See, e.g., Massachusetts Bar Op. 1 1-03 (2011)(not violation of Rules 4.2 and 8.4(a) for lawyer to advise client to
another person to release attachment on clienPs property, even though other person is represented by counsel); Oregon
Eth. Op. Op. 2005-147 (1997)(Direct Communication Between Represented Parties)("Allowing the parties themselves
to discuss the issues and possible avenues for settlement does not conflict with the policy behind the rule [prohibiting a
lawyer from causing another to communicate on the subject ofthe representation]." ); California Comm. on Profl Resp.
and Conduct Formal
Op. 1993-131 (1993) (lawyer may confer with client as to strategy to be pursued in, goals to be achieved by, and
general nature of communication client intends to initiate with opposing party as long as communication itself
originates with, and is directed by, client and not the lawyer); Michigan Gth. Op. CI-920 (1983)(in domestic relation
case, it is permissible for lawyer to give client draft settlement proposal even when lawyer knows client may discuss
document with spouse who is represented by counsel); San Francisco Aar Assoc. Informal Op. 1985-1 (1985)(lawyer
may allow or encourage his client to attempt to resolve dispute by communicating directly with opposing party, so long
as client is not directly or indirectly acting as agent of lawyer).
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to the other party. The "no contact' rules applied in these opinions, however, differ from the Model Rues
in that they do not contain the relevant language in Rule 4.2 Comment [4] that "a lawyer is not prohibited
from advising a client concerning a communication that the client is legally entitled to make." As the
Committee observed in Formal Op. 92-362, other rules may require that, in some situations, a lawyer
advise the client to consider communicating directly with her represented adversary about a matter related
to the representation. Rule i .I requires that "[a] lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client."
Rule 1.4(a)(2) requires the lawyer to consult with the client as to the means by which the client's objectives
are to be accomplished.10 These fundamental ethical principles, coupled with the comments to Rules 4.2
and 8.4(a), suggest that the assistance a lawyer may give to a client extends beyond advising her of her
right to communicate with her adversary.
Rule 8.4(a)'s prohibition against a lawyer's violating the rules through the acts of another raises
questions about what a lawyer may or may not say to the lawyer's client, or what the lawyer may do to
assist the client in communicating directly with the represented opponent. These issues were explicitly left
unaddressed in Formal Op. 92-362. When Formal Opinion 92-362 was issued, the comments to Rules 4.2
and 8.4 did not contain the current language that expressly permits the lawyer to advise the client regarding
communications the client is legally entitled to make and actions the client is legally entitled to take. There
is very little authority that provides guidance in any context regarding the scope of assistance and advice a
lawyer may give a client tinder the comments to Rules 4.2 and 8.4. Some authority states that because of
Rule 8.4(a)'s prohibition against violating or attempting to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct
through the acts of another, a lawyer may not "script" or "mastermind" a client's communication with a
represented person and may violate Rule 4,2 by preparing legal documents for the client to have a
represented person sign without the assistance of their counsel. ~ ~ What constitutes "scripting" or
"masterminding" the communication is not clear, but such a standard, if too stringently applied, would
unduly inhibit permissible and proper advice to the client regarding the content of the communication,
greatly restricting the assistance the lawyer may appropriately give to a client.12 Relying on language
similar to Comment [4] of Model Rule 4.2, the Restatement (Third) of The I,aw Governing Lmvyers(2000)
("the ReslatemenP') explains:
The lawyer for a client intending to make such a communication may advise the client regarding legal
aspects of the communication, such as whether an intended communication is libelous or would
otherwise create risk for the client. Prohibiting such advice would unduly restrict the client's autonomy,
the client's interest in obtaining important legal advice, and the client's ability to communicate fully with
the lawyer.i 13
~ See, e.g., Miano v. AC & R Advertising, Inc., 148 F.R.D. 68, 82(S.D.N.Y. 1993)('`where a client directly asks his or
her attorney whether he should approach a represented adversary, the attorney may not ethically recommend or endorse
such action"); N.Y, City Ethics Op. 2002-3(2002)(if client "conceives of the idea" of communicating with represented
adversary, lawyer may advise client about it but must avoid helping client Co either elicit confidential information or
encourage other party to proceed without counsel); Massachusetts Bar Op. 82-8 (1982) (lawyer who has prepared
settlement agreement on client's behalf'should discourage client from speciticalty discussing settlement with other party
or directly sending letter that addresses settlement without consent oFthat party's lawyer).
10 See ABA Formal Op. 92-362, FORMAL AND INFORMAL ETHICS OPINtONS 19A3-~~9H dt SS.
~~ See, e.g., Holdgren v. General Motors Corp., 13 F.Supp.2d 1192, 1193-96 (D.Kan. 1998) (lawyer in age
discrimination case violated rules of professional conduct "through the acts of another" by encouraging client to obtain
affidavits from coworkers, advising him of difference between "out of court statements" and signed affidavits for trial
purposes, and advising him how to draft affidavit); in re Pyle, 91 P.3d 1222, 1228-29 (Kan. 2004) (lawyer
"circumvented the constraints" of Rule 4.2 by, at client's request, preparing affidavit for her to deliver to represented
defendant in personal injury case); California Comm, on Profl Resp. and Conduct Formal Op. 1993-131 ("An attorney
is also prohibited from scripting the questions to be asked or statements to he made in the communications or otherwise
using the client as a conduit for conveying to the represented opposing party words or thoughts originating with the
attorney."); Massachusetts Bar Op. 1 I-03("We believe, however, that the lawyer would cross the line if she prepared a
release of the attachment and presented it to the sister f'or execution without the knowledge end express permission of
the sister's lawyer." ).
~Z See n. i l .
Leubsdorf,
~~ RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF T~lIE L,AW GOVF..RNING LAWYERS & 99 C»1t (k) (2~~0). S¢e C7/SO John
Communica~rng With Another Gcrwyer's Client• The Lmvyer's Vefo and the Client's Interests, 127 U. Pa. L. REv. 683,
697 (1979) ("An extension of the [no-contact] rule to communications between clients is hard to reconcile with its
ostensible purposes. Whatever dangers flow from the confrontation of professional guile with (1y innocence are absent
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Restatement § 99 Illustration 6 clarifies this point with the following scenario. A lawyer represents a client
who has a dispute with a contractor. On her own, the client drafts a letter outlining her position in the
dispute and shows a copy to her lawyer. Viewing the draft as inappropriate, the lawyer redrafts the letter
and recommends that the client send it out as redrafted. The client does so. The Restatement concludes
that the lawyer's assistance to the client was not an improper communication with a represented person.
The lawyer also may draft a document for the client to deliver to the represented adversary
although authority restricts the lawyer's assistance to situations where the client originates the
communication, stating that it is improper for the lawyer to originate or direct the proposed
communication.14 Section 99 of the Restatement does not explicitly address this question, although
Comment (k) and Illustration 6 are based on the client having originated a proposed communication with a
represented adversary. The line between permissible advice and impermissible assistance may not always
be clear. This Committee does not think that line should 6e drawn based on who initiates the first draft of a
communication with a represented adversary. Such an approach favors only those clients who have the
sophistication to ask the lawyer to draft a document for the client to give to a represented adversary. In
addition, allowing the lawyer to assist only if the client originates the substance of the communication
leaves the unsophisticated client without the benefit of the lawyer's advice in formulating communications
that the rules allow the client to have with a represented person. Instead, the line must be drawn on the
basis of whether the lawyer's assistance is an attempt to circumvent the basic purpose of Rule 4.2, to
prevent a client from making uninformed or otherwise irrational decisions as a result of undue pressure
from opposing counsel.
This Committee believes that, without violating Rules 4.2 or 8,4(a), a lawyer may give substantial
assistance to a client regarding a substantive communication with a represented adversary. That advice
could include, for example, the subjects or topics to be addressed, issues to be raised and strategies to be
used. Such advice may be liven regardless of who—the lawyer or the client—conceives of the idea of
having the communication.
This Committee favors the approach taken by Restatement § 99 Comment (k). Under that
approach, the lawyer may advise the client about the content of the communications that the client proposes
to have with the represented person. For example, the lawyer may review, redraft and approve a letter or a
set of talking points that the client has drafted and wishes to use in her communications with her
represented adversary. Such advice enables tha client to communicate her points more articulately and
accurately or to prevent the client from disadvantaging herself. The client also could request that the
lawyer draft the basic terms of a proposed settlement agreement that she wishes to have with her adverse
spouse, or to draft a formal agreement ready for execution. Rules 4.2 and 8.4(a) may permit the lawyer to
fulfill the client's request without violating the lawyer's ethical obligations. However, in advising the
client, counsel must be careful not to violate the underlying purpose of Rule 4.2, as explained in Rule 4.2
Comment (l]:
This Rule contributes to the proper functioning of the legal system by protecting a person who has
chosen to be represented by a lawyer in a matter against possible overreaching by other lawyers who are
participating in the matter, interference by those lawyers with the client-lawyer relationship and the
uncounseiled disclosure of information relating to the representation.t5
when t~vo nonlawyers communicate.... Perhaps we have again come across the desire to keep disputes safely in the
control of lawyers."); James G. Sweeney, Attorneys' Arrogance: Wnrnrng Unheeded, N.Y.L.J., June 17, 1991, at 2 co(.
3 ("To deny or deter the client from the opportunity of entering into the gauging process of what value is to him in a
particular dispute by denying him an opportunity to sit at the bargaining table with his adversary works against the very
fundamental idea of the self and of human autonomy.").
14 See, e.g., California Comm, on Profl Resp. and Conduct Formal Op. 1993-131 (``When the content of the
communication to he had with the opposing party originates tivith or is directed by the attorney, it is prohibited by rule
2-100.").
15 See ABA Formal Opinion 95-396 (1995), tR FORMAL AND INFORMAL ETHICS OPINIONS 1983-1998 (ABA 2000) at
330, 334 ("The anti-contact rules provide protection of the represented person against overrelching by adverse counsel,
safeguard the client-lawyer relationship from interference by adverse counsel, and reduce the likelihood that clients will
disclose privileged or other information that might harm their interests."). See also Niesig v, Team I, 558 N.B.2d 1030,
1032(N.Y. 1990)("By preventing lawyers from deliberately dodging adversary counsel to reach-and-exploit the client
alone, [the rule prohibiting communicating with a person represented by counsel] safeguards against clients making
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Prime examples of overreaching include assisting the client in securing from the represented person an
enforceable obligation, disclosure of confidential information, or admissions against interest without the
opportunity to seek the advice of counsel, To prevent such overreaching, a lawyer must, at a minimum,
advise her client to encourage the other party to consult with counsel before entering into obligations,
making admissions or disclosing confidential information. If counsel has drafted a proposed agreement for
the client to deliver to her represented adversary for execution, counsel should include in such agreement
conspicuous language on the signature page that warns the other party to consult with his lawyer before
signing the agreement.16

improvident settlements, ill-advised disclosures and unwlrranted concessions."); State v. Gilliam, 748 So.2d 622, 638
(La. Ct. App. 1999), writ denied, 769 So.2d 1215 (La. 2000)(rule intended to "prevent disclosure of attorney-client
communications and to protect a party from `liability-creating statements' elicited by a skilled interrogator"); Messing,
Rudaysky & Weliky, P.C. v. President and Fellows of Harvard Coilege, 764 N.E.2d 825, 830 (Mass. 2000) (rule

preserves counsel's "mediating rule" and protects clients from overreaching by other lawyers); Polycast Tech Corp. v.
Uniroyal, Inc., 129 F.R.D, 621, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)(rule prevents lawyers from eliciting "unwise statements" from
opponents, protects privileged information, and facilitates settlements by allowing lawyers to conduct negotiations);
CHARLES W. WOLPRFlM, MODERN L[GAL ETFIICS, § 11.6.2, at btl (1986) ("The prohibition is founded upon the
possibility of treachery that might result if lawyers were free to exploit the presumably vulnerable position of a
represented but unadvised party"); EC 7-18 ("The legal system in its broadest sense functions best when persons in
need of legal advice or assistance are represented by their own counsel.").
~~ This opinion does not address situations in which a lawyer advises a client with respect to using an investigator or
agent to gather facts from a represented person. These situations may involve a variety of factors, not considered in this
opinion, relevant to the presence or absence of overreaching.
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Formal Opinion 11-460
Duty when Lawyer Receives Copies of a Third Party's E-mail Communications with Counsel
When an employer's lcnvyer receives copies of an employee's private communications with counsel, which
the employer located in the employee's business e-mailfile or on the employee's workplace compz~ter or
other device, neither Rzrle 9.4(b) nor any other Rarle requires the employer's lawyer to notify opposing
coarnse! ofthe receipt ofthe commainications. however, coa+rt decisions, civil procectarre ra~les, or other !aw
may impose such a notification darty, which a lmvyer may then be subject to discipline for violating. Ifthe
law governing potential ciiscloszrre is unclear, Rule 1.6(b)(6) allotivs the employer's lawyer to disclose that
the employer has r•eirieved t6ze employee's attorney-client e-mail communications to the extent the Icnvyer
reasonably believes it is necessary to coo so to comply tivith the relevant law. !f no law can reasonably be
read as estahlishing a notification obligation, however, [hen the decision tivhether to give notice mzrst be
made by the employer-client, and the employer's lawyer marst explain the implications of disclosure, and
the availafile alternatives, as necessary lv enable the employer to make an informed decision.
This opinion addresses a lawyer's ethical duty upon receiving copies of e-mails between a third
party and the third party's lawyer.' We explore this question in the context of the following hypothetical
scenario.
After an employee files a lawsuit against her employer, the employer copies the contents of her
workplace computer for possible use in defending the lawsuit, and provides copies to its outside counsel.
Upon review, the employer's counsel sees that some of the employee's e-mails bear the legend "AttomeyClient Confidential Communication." Must the employer's counsel notify the employee's lawyer that the
employer• has accessed this correspondence?2
When an employer's lawyer receives copies of an employee's private communications with
counsel, which the employer located in the employee's business e-mail file or on the employee's workplace
computer or other device, the question arises whether the employer's lawyer must notify opposing counsel
pursuant to Rule 4.4(b). This Rule provides: "A lawyer who receives a document relating to the
representation of the lawyer's client and knows or reasonably should know that the document was
inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender."
Rule 4.4(b) does not expressly address this situation, because e-mails between an employee and
his or her counsel are not "inadvertently sent" by either of them. A "document [is] inadvertently sent" to
someone when it is accidentally transmitted to an unintended recipient, as occurs when an e-mail or letter is
misaddressed or when a document is accidentally attached to an e-mail or accidentally included among
other documents produced in discovery. But a document is not "inadvertently sent" when it is retrieved by
a third person from a public or private place where it is stored or left.
The question remains whether Rule 4.4(b) implicitly addresses this situation. In several cases,
courts have found that Rule 4.4(b) or its underlying principle requires disclosure in analogous situations,
such as when "confidential documents are sent intentionally and without permission." Chamberlain
Grozrp, /nc. v. Lear Corp., 270 F.R.D. 392, 398 (N.D. Ill. 2010).' in Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc.,
~ This opinion is based on the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct as amended by the ABA t-louse
of Delegates through August 2011. The laws, court rules, regulations, rules of professional conduct, and
opinions promulgated in individual jurisdictions are controlling.
2 For a discussion of the employee's lawyer's obligation to take reasonable steps to prevent a situation such
as this from arising, see ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-459(2011)(Duty
to Protect the Confidentiality of E-mail Communications With One's Client).
'See also Webb v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., No,08 C 6241, 2011 WL 1743338, at * 12-13 (N.D. Ill. May 6,
2011); Burt Hill, Inc. v. Hassan, No. Civ.A. 09-1285, ZO10 WL 419433, at *3-5 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2010);
Allen v, Int'! Truck &Engine, No. 1:02-CV-0902-RLY-TAB, 2006 WL 2578896, at *11-12 (S.D. Ind.
Sept. 6, 2006). Bzr! see Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Felman Production, Cnc., 271 Q.R.D. 125, 130-31 (S.D. W.
Va. 2010)(lawyer receiving inadvertently sent materials not required to notify another party or that party's
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990 A.2d 650, 665 (N.J. 2010), the court found that the employer's lawyer in an employment litigation
violated the state's version of Rule 4.4(b)4 by failing to notify the employee's counsel that the employer
had downloaded and intended to use copies of pre-suit e-mail messages exchanged between the employee
and her lawyers.s
Since Rule 4.4(b) was added to the Model Rules, this Committee twice has declined to interpret it
or other rules to require notice to opposing counsel other than in the situation that Rule 4.4(b) expressly
addresses. In ABA Formal Op. 06-442 (2006), we considered whether a lawyer could properly review
and use information embedded in electronic documents (i.e., metadata) received from opposing counsel or
an adverse party. We concluded, contrary to some other bar association ethics committees, that the Rule
did not apply. We reasoned that "the recent addition of Rule 4.4(b) identifying the sole requirement of
providing notice to the sender of the receipt of inadvertently sent information [was] evidence of the
intention to set no other specific restrictions on the receiving lawyer's conduct."~ Likewise, in ABA
Formal Op. 06-440, this Committee found that Rule 4.4(b) does not obligate a lawyer to notify opposing
counsel that the lawyer has received privileged or otherwise confidential materials of the adverse party
from someone who was not authorized to provide the materials, if the materials were not provided as "the

lawyer of receipt as matter of compliance with ethics rules).
" The New Jersey rule provided: "[a] lawyer who receives a document and has reasonable cause to believe
that the document was inadvertently sent shall not read the document or, if he or she has begun to do so,
shall stop reading the document, promptly notify the sender, and return the document to the sender." New
Jersey Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4(b)(2004).
5 The Stengart court found that the employee "had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy" in the
e-mails based on the fact that the employee "could reasonably expect that e-mail communications with her
lawyer through her personal account would remain private, and that sending and receiving them via a
company laptop did not eliminate the attorney-client privilege that protected them." 990 A.2d at 655. In
contrast, other decisions arising in different factual situations have found that the attorney-client privilege
did not protect client-lawyer communications downloaded by an employer from a computer used by its
employees. These other decisions have not suggested that the employer's lawyer had a notification duty
when the employer provided copies of the employee's attorney-client communications to the employer's
lawyer. See, e.g., Long v. Mai•ubeni Am. Corp., No. 05-CIV-639(GEL)(KNF), 2006 WL 2998671, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2006); Kaufman v. SunGard Inv. Sys., l~'o. OS-CV-1236 (JLL), 2006 WL 1307882, at
*3 (D.N.J. May 9, 2006); Scott v. Beth Israel Medical Center, Cne., 847 N.Y.S.2d 436, 444(Sup. Ct. 2007).
`' One might argue, for example, that the lawyer is prohibited from reading or using the e-mails by any of
several other rules. These include Rule 4.4(a), which requires lawyers to refrain from using "methods of
obtaining evidence that violate [a third person's] legal rights," and which, according to the accompanying
comment, forbids "unwarranted intrusions into privileged relationships, such as the client-lawyer
relationship." These also include Rule 8.4(c), which forbids "conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation," and Rule 8.4(d), which forbids "conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice."
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-442 (2006) (Review and Use of
Metadata). Prior to the adoption of Rule 4.4(b) in February 2002, this Committee had issued opinions
addressing a lawyer's obligations upon receiving materials of an adverse party on an unauthorized basis
when the lawyer knew that the materials were privileged or confidential, and addressing a lawyer's
obligations when the opposing party inadvertently disclosed privileged or confidential materials. See ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-382 (1994)(Unsolicited Receipt of Privileged
or Confidential Materials), in FORMAL AND INFORMAL ETHICS OPiNiONS 1983-1998 (ABA 2000) at 233;

ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof] Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-368 (1992) (Inadvertent Disclosure of
Confidential Materials), id. at 140. The Committee concluded that the lawyer's obligations implicitly
derived from other law and from provisions such as Rule 8.4 (prohibiting "conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation" and conduct "prejudicial to the administration ofjustice") that did not
expressly address these situations. /d. at 144-49, 234. I-Iowever, the Committee withdrew both of these
opinions following the adoption of Rule 4.4(b). See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility,
Formal Op. 06-440 (2006) (Unsolicited Receipt of Privileged or Confidential Materials: Withdrawal of
Formal Opinion 94-382); ABA Comm, on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. OS-437 (2005)
(Inadvertent Disclosure of Confidential Materials: Withdrawal of Formal Opinion 92-368).
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result of the sender's inadvertence."a We noted that other' law might prevent the receiving lawyer from
retaining and using the materials, and that the lawyer might be subject to sanction for doing so, but
concluded that this was "a matter of law beyond the scope of Rule 4.4(b)."~
To say that Rule 4.4(b) and other rules are inapplicable is not to say that courts cannot or should
not impose a disclosure obligation in this context pursuant to their supervisory or other authority. As
Comment [2] to Rule 4.4(b) observes,"this Rule does not address the legal duties of a lawyer who receives
a document that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know may have been wrongfully obtained by the
sending person.s10 Pursuant to their supervisory authority, courts may require lawyers in litigation to
notify the opposing counsel when their clients provide an opposing party's attorney-client confidential
communications that were retrieved from a computer or other device owned or possessed by the client,
Alternatively, the civil procedure rules governing discovery in the litigation may require the employer to
notify the employee that it has gained possession of the employee's attorney-client communications.
Insofar as courts recognize a legal duty in this situation, as the court in Stengart has done, a lawyer may be
subject to discipline, not just litigation sanction, for knowingly violating it.~' However, the Model Rules
do not independently impose an ethical duty to notify opposing counsel of the receipt of private, potentially
privileged e-mail communications between the opposing party and his or her counsel.
When the law governing potential disclosure is unclear, the lawyer need not risk violating a legal
or ethical obligation. The fact that the employer-client has obtained copies of the employee's e-mails is
"information relating to the representation of [the] client' that must be kept confidential under Rule 1.6(a)
unless there is an applicable exception to the confidentiality obligation or the client gives "informed
consent" to disclosure. Rule 1.6(b)(6) permits a lawyer to "reveal information relating to the representation
of a client to the extent the 1lwyer reasonably believes necessary ... to comply with other law or a court
order." Rule 1.6(b)(6) allows the employer's lawyer to disclose that the employer has retrieved the
employee's attorney-client e-mail communications to the extent he or she reasonably believes it is
necessary to do so to comply with the relevant law, even if the legal obligation is not free fi•om doubt. On
the other hand, if no law can reasonably be read as establishing a reporting obligation, then the decision
whether to give notice must be made by the employer-client. Even when there is no clear notification
obligation, it often will be in the employer-client's best interest to give notice and obtain a judicial ruling as
to the admissibility of the employee's attorney-client communications before attempting to use them and, if
possible, before the employer's lawyer reviews them. This course minimizes the risk of disqualification or
other sanction if the court ultimately concludes that the opposing party's communications with counsel are
privileged and inadmissible. The employer's lawyer must explain these and other implications of
disclosure, and the available alternatives, as necessary to enable the employer to make an informed
decision. See Rules 1.0(e)(Terminology,"informed consent"), 1.4(b)("A lawyer shall explain a matter to
the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation"), and 1.6(a) ("lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client
unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation or the disclosure is permitted by [the exceptions under Rule 1.6(b)]").

$ Supra n. 7.
9 Id. A recent article suggests that Rule 1.15(d) imposes a notification duty in the analogous situation in
tivhich a lawyer comes into possession of physical documents that appear to have been wrongly procured
from another party. Brian S. Faughan &Douglas R. Richmond,"Model Rule 1.15: The Elegant Solution to
the Problem of Purloined Documents," 26 ABA/BNA Lnw. MnN. PROF'. CONDUCT 623 (Oct. 13, 2010).
Rule ].15(d) provides, in pertinent part: "Upon receiving ... property in which a client or third person has
an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person." The provision arises out of the
lawyer's fiduciary duty to safeguard money and property belonging to another and entrusted to the lawyer.
Regardless of whether this rule may apply when stolen physical items come into a lawyer's possession, we
do not believe it applies when an organizational client gives its lawyer copies of documents that were on a
computer in the client's lawful possession for the lawyer's potential use in litigation. What is at stake is not
the third party's proprietary interest in the copies of e-mails but the third party's confidentiality interest,
which Rule I.1 S(d) does not address.
10Accord ABA Formal Op. OG-440.
~~ See, e.g., Rule 3.4(c)("A lawyer shall not knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal
except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists.").
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A lawyer sending or receiving substantive communications with a client via e-mail or other electronic
means ordinarily must tivarn the client about the risk of.sending or receiving electronic commarnications
using a computer or other device, or e-mail accoarnt, where there is a significant risk that a third party may
gain access. /n the context ofrepresenting an emp/oyee, this obligation arises, at the very least, when the
lawyer knotivs or reasonably should know that the client is likely to send or receive substantive clientIcnvyer commernications via e-mail or other electronic means, using a business device or system under
circzrmstances tivhere there is a significant risk that the commzrniccrtions will he read by the employer or
another third party. ~
Introduction
Lawyers and clients often communicate with each other via e-mail and sometimes communicate
via other electronic means such as text messaging. The confidentiality of these communications may be
jeopardized in certain circumstances. For example, when the client uses an employer's computer,
smartphone or other telecommunications device, or an employer's e-mail account to send or receive e-mails
with counsel, the employer may obtain access to the e-mails. Employers often have policies reserving a
right of access to employees' e-mail correspondence via the employer's e-mail account, computers or other
devices, such as smartphones and tablet devices, Prom which their employees correspond. Pursuant to
internal policy, the employer may be able to obtain an employee's communications from the employer's email server if the employee uses a business e-mail address, or from a workplace computer or other
employer-owned telecommunications device on which the e-mail is stored even if the employee has used a
separate, personal e-mail account. Employers may take advantage of that opportunity in various contexts,
such as when the client is engaged in an employment dispute or when the employer is monitoring employee
e-mails as part of its compliance responsibilities or conducting an internal investigation relating to the
client's work.' Moreover, other third parties may be able to obtain access to an employee's electronic
Unlike conversations and written
communications by issuing a subpoena to the employer.
once they are created.
permanently
available
be
communications, e-mail communications may
The confidentiality of electronic communications between a lawyer and client may be jeopardized
in other settings as well. Third parties may have access to attorney-client e-mails when the client receives
or sends e-mails via a public computer, such as a library or hotel computer, or via a borrowed computer.
Third parties also may be able to access confidential communications when the client uses a computer or
other device available to others, such as when a client in a matrimonial dispute uses a home computer to
which other family members have access.
In contexts such as these, clients may be unaware of the possibility that a third party may gain
access to their personal correspondence and may fail to take necessary precautions. Therefore, the risk t}~at
third parties may obtain access to a lawyer's e-mail communications with a client raises the question of
what, if any, steps a lawyer must take to prevent such access by third parties fi•om occurring. This opinion
addresses this question in the following hypothetical situation.
An employee has a computer assigned for her exclusive use in the course of her employment. The
company's written internal policy provides that the company has a right of access to all employees'
computers and e-mail files, including those relating to employees' personal matters. Notwithstanding this

~ This opinion is based on the ABA Mode] Rules of Professional Conduct as amended by the ABA f-louse
of Delegates through August 201 1. The laws, court rules, regulations, rules of professional conduct, and
opinions promulgated in individualjurisdictions are controlling.
z Companies conducting internal investigations often secure and examine the e-mail communications and
computer files of employees who are thought to have relevant information.

https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss9/34
DOI: 10.58188/1941-8043.1347

24

Gaal: Handout 3: Transactions with Persons Other Than Clients

11-459 Formal Opinion

2

policy, employees sometimes make personal use of their computers, including for the purpose of sending
personal e-mail messages from their personal or office e-mail accounts. Recently, the employee retained a
lawyer to give advice about a potential claim against her employer. When the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know that the employee may use a workplace device or system to communicate with the lawyer,
does the lawyer have an ethical duty to warn the employee about the risks this practice entails?
Discussion
Absent an applicable exception, Rule 1.6(a) requires a lawyer to refrain from revealing
"information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent." Further, a
lawyer must act competently to protect the confidentiality of clients' information. This duty, which is
implicit in the obligation of Rule 1.1 to "provide competent representation to a client," is recognized in two
Comments to Rule 1.6. Comment [16~ observes that a lawyer must "act competently to safeguard
information relating to the representation of a client against inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the
lawyer or other persons who are participating in the representation of the client or who are subject to the
lawyer's supervision." Comment [17j states in part: "When transmitting a communication that includes
information relating to the representation of a client, the lawyer must take reasonable precautions to prevent
the information from coming into the hands of unintended recipients.... Factors to be considered in
determining the reasonableness of the lawyer's expectation of confidentiality include the sensitivity of the
information and the extent to which the privacy of the communication is protected by law or by a
confidentiality agreement."
This Committee has recognized that these provisions of the Model Rules require lawyers to take
reasonable care to protect the confidentiality of client information,3 including information contained in email communications made in the course of a representation. In ABA Op. 99-413 (1999)("Protecting the
Confidentiality of Unencrypted E-Mail"), the Committee concluded that, in general, a lawyer may transmit
information relating to the representation of a client by unencrypted e-mail sent over the Internet without
violating Model Rule 1.6(a) because the mode of transmission affords a reasonable expectation of privacy
from a technological and legal standpoint. The opinion, nevertheless, cautioned lawyers to consult with
their clients and follow their clients' instructions as to the mode of transmitting highly sensitive information
relating to the clients' representation, It found that particularly strong protective measures are warranted to
guard against the disclosure of highly sensitive matters.
Clients may not be afforded a "reasonable expectation of privacy" when they t~se an employer's
computer to send e-mails to their lawyers or receive e-mails from their lawyers, Judicial decisions illustrate
the risk that the employer will read these e-mail communications and seek to use them to the employee's
disadvantage. Under varying facts, courts have reached different conclusions about whether an employee's
client-lawyer communications located on a workplace computer or system are privileged, and the law
appears to be evolving. This Committee's mission does not extend to interpreting the substantive law, and
'See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and ProFl Responsibility, Formal Op. 08-451 (2008) (Lawyer's
Obligations When Outsourcing Legal and Nonlegal Support Services)("the obligation to `act competently
to safeguard information relating to the representation of a client against inadvertent or unauthorized
disclosure by the lawyer or other persons who are participating in the representation of'the client or who are
subject to the lawyer's supervision"' requires a lawyer outsourcing legal work "to recognize and minimize
the risk that any outside service provider may inadvertently -- or perhaps even advertently -- reveal client
confidential information to adverse parties or to others who are not entitled to access ,., [and to] verify that
the outside service provider does not also do work for adversaries of their clients on the same or
substantially related matters,").
~ See, e.g., Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 663 (N.J. 2010)(privilege applied to emailswith counsel using "a personal, password protected e-mail account" that were accessed on a company
computer); Sims v. Lakeside Sch., No. C06-1412RSM, 2007 WL 2745367, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 20,
2007)(privilege applied to web-based e-mails to and from employee's counsel on hard drive of computer
furnished by employer); National Econ. Research Assocs. v. Evans, No. 04-2618—BLS2, 21 Mass.L.Rptr.
337, 20Q6 WL 2440008, at *5 (Mass, Super. Aug. 3, 2006) (privilege applied to "attorney-client
communications unintentionally stored in a temporary file on a company-owned computer that were made
via a private, password-protected e-mail account accessed through the Internet, not the company's
[ntranet"); Holmes v. Petrovich Development Co., 19l Cal.App.4`h 1047, 1068-72 (2011) (privilege
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therefore we express no view on whether, and in what circumstances, an employee's communications with
counsel from the employee's workplace device or system are protected by the attorney-client privilege.
Nevertheless, we consider the ethical implications posed by the risks that these communications will be
reviewed by others and held admissible in legal proceedings.s Given these risks, a lawyer should ordinarily
advise the employee-client about the importance of communicating with the lawyer in a manner that
protects the confidentiality of e-mail communications,just as a lawyer should avoid speaking face-to-face
with a client about sensitive matters if the conversation might be overheard and should warn the client
against discussing their communications with others. In particular, as soon as practical after aclient-lawyer
relationship is established, a lawyer typically should instruct the employee-client to avoid using a
workplace device or system for sensitive or substantive communications, and perhaps for any attorneyclient communications, because even seemingly ministerial communications involving matters such as
scheduling can have substantive ramifications.
The time at which a lawyer has an ethical obligation under Rules 1.] and 1.6 to provide advice of
this nature will depend on the circumstances. At the very least, in the context of representing an employee,
this ethical obligation arises when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the client is likely to
send or receive substantive client-lawyer communications via e-mail or other electronic means, using a
business device or system under circumstances where there is a significant risk that the communications
will be read by the employer or another third party. Considerations tending to establish an ethical duty to
protect client-lawyer confidentiality by warning the client against using a business device or system for
substantive e-mail communications with counsel include, but are not limited to, the following:(1) that the
client has engaged in, or has indicated an intent to engage in, e-mail communications with counsel;(2) that
the client is employed in a position that would provide access to a workplace device or system; (3) that,
given the circumstances, the employer or a third party has the ability to access the e-mail communications;
and (4) that, as far as the lawyer knows, the employer's internal policy and the jurisdiction's laws do not
clearly protect the privacy of the employee's personal e-mail communications via a business device or
system. CJn(ess a lawyer has reason to believe otherwise, a lawyer ordinarily should assume that an
employer's internal policy allows for access to the employee's e-mails sent to or from a workplace device
or system.
The situation in the above hypothetical is a clear ~~~~~~~~of where failing to warn the client about
the risks of e-mailing communications on the employer's device can harm the client, because the
employment dispute would give the employer a significant incentive to access the employee's workplace email and the employer's internal policy would provide a justification for doing so. The obligation arises
once the lawyer has reason to believe that there is a significant risk that the client will conduct e-mail
communications with the lawyer using a workplace computer or other business device or via the
employer's e-mail account. This possibility ordinarily would be known, or reasonably should be known, at
the outset of the representation. Given the nature of the representation—an employment dispute—the lawyer
is on notice that the employer may search the client's electronic correspondence. Therefore, the lawyer
must ascertain, unless the answer is already obvious, whether there is a significant risk that the client will
use a business e-mail address for personal communications or whether the employee's position entails
using an employer's device. Protective measures would include the lawyer refraining from sending e-mails

inapplicable to communications with counsel using workplace computer); Scott v. Beth Israel Medical
Center, Inc., 847 N.Y.S.2d 436, 440-43 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) (privilege inapplicable to employer's
communications with counsel via employer's e-mail system); Long v. Marubeni Am. Corp., No.
OSCIV.639(GBL)(KNF), 2006 WL 2998671, at *3-4 (S.D.N,Y. Oct. 19, 2006)(e-mails created or stored in
company computers were not privileged, notwithstanding use of private password-protected e-mail
accounts); Kaufman v. SunGard Cnv, Sys., No. OS-CV-1236 (JLL), 2006 WL 1307882, at *4 (D.N.J. May
10, 2006)(privilege inapplicable to communications with counsel using employer's network).
5 For a discussion of a lawyer's duty when receiving a third party's e-mail communications with counsel,
,see ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 1I-460 (2011) (Duty when Lawyer
Receives Copies of a Third Party's E-mail Communications with Counsel).
~ This opinion principally addresses e-mail communications, which are the most common way in which
lawyers communicate electronically with clients, but it is equally applicable to other means of electronic
communications.
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to the client's workplace, as distinct from personal, e-mail address,' and cautioning the client against using
a business e-mail account or using a personal e-mail account on a workplace computer or device at least for
substantive e-mails with counsel.
As noted at the outset, the employment scenario is not the only one in which attorney-client
electronic communications may be accessed by third parties. A lawyer sending or receiving substantive
communications with a client via e-mail or other electronic means ordinarily must warn the client about the
risk of sending or receiving electronic communications using a computer or other device, ore-mail account,
to which a third party may gain access. The risk may vary. Whenever a lawyer communicates with a client
by e-mail, the lawyer must first consider whether, given the client's situation, there is a significant risk that
third parties will have access to the communications. If so, the lawyer must take reasonable care to protect
the confidentiality of the communications by giving appropriately tailored advice to the client.

~ Of course, if the lawyer becomes aware that a client is receiving personal e-mail on a workplace computer
or other device owned or controlled by the employer, then a duty arises to caution the client not to do so,
and if that caution is not heeded, to cease sending messages even to personal e-mail addresses.
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